Ralph L. Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, L.L.C., John K. Hayes, M.D. : Brief of Appellee by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2008
Ralph L. Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy,
L.L.C., John K. Hayes, M.D. : Brief of Appellee
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kay Burningham; Attorney for Appellant.
Robert G. Wright; George T. Naegle; Zachary E. Peterson; Attorneys for Appellees.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Daniels v. Gamma West, No. 20080201.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2790
:\l\: UTAH SI IPREMI 
• t-*,*11ant 
VS. 
i West Brachytherapy, L.L.C., 
tv. Hayes, M.D., 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 20080201 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from hu > Verdict and Final Order from the i hird Distnrt Cnnri Ssilt Lake 
County, State of Utah, Judge Robin VV. Reest 
KAY BURNINGHAM 
9235 Sandtrap Court 
Park City, UT 84098 
Email: kay@kaybumingham.com 
Telephone: (435) 649-6786 
Fax No.: (435) 649-6796 
Attorney for Appellant 
ROBERT G. WRIGHT [D363] 
GEORGE T. NAEGLE [5001] 
ZACHARY E. PETERSON [8502] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Wells Fargo Center, 15th Floor 
299 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
E-mail: robert-wright@rbmn.com 
george-naegle@rbmn.com 
zachary-peterson@rbmn.com 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801)531-2000 
Fax No.: (801)532-5506 
Attorneys for Appellees 
FIIFD 
1
 " ' E COURTS 
II H I N|, | 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Ralph L. Daniels, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
Gamma West Brachytherapy, L.L.C., 
John K. Hayes, M.D., 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 20080201 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from Jury Verdict and Final Order from the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, Judge Robin W. Reese 
KAY BURNINGHAM 
9235 Sandtrap Court 
Park City, UT 84098 
Email: kay@kaybumingham.com 
Telephone: (435) 649-6786 
Fax No.: (435) 649-6796 
Attorney for Appellant 
ROBERT G. WRIGHT [5363] 
GEORGE T. NAEGLE [5001] 
ZACHARY E. PETERSON [8502] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Wells Fargo Center, 15th Floor 
299 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
E-mail: robert-wright@rbmn.com 
george-naegle@rbmn.com 
zachary-peterson@rbmn.com 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801)531-2000 
Fax No.: (801)532-5506 
Attorneys for Appellees 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The front caption contains all of the parties to the appeal. The University Hospital and 
Salt Lake Regional Medical Center were also defendants before the district court; 
however, both were dismissed before trial and neither are parties to the appeal. 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue 1; Did the trial court properly instruct the jury as to the applicable law 
regarding whether plaintiff had timely filed his medical malpractice claim? 
Issue 2: Did the trial court correctly allow defendants to use plaintiffs 
superseded pleading for the limited purposes of impeachment and refreshing a witness's 
memory? 
Issue 3: Did the trial court properly exercise its discretion to exclude evidence of 
insurance at trial? 
Issue 4: Did the trial court properly grant defendants' motion for partial 
summary judgment on plaintiffs claim for punitive damages where plaintiff had not 
alleged sufficient facts to warrant an award of punitive damages? 
Issue 5: Was the trial court's decision to deny plaintiff the opportunity to alter 
his expert witness's opinions a third time a proper exercise of its discretion? 
Issue 6: Did the trial court properly deny plaintiffs second motion to amend his 
complaint when the proposed claim for breach of fiduciary duty was duplicative of an 
existing claim for lack of informed consent? 
Issue 7: Was the trial court's decision to deny plaintiff the opportunity to add a 
fraudulent concealment claim a proper exercise of its discretion? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: Challenges to jury instructions are reviewed under 
a correctness standard. See Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425,429 (Utah 1998). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The admission or exclusion of evidence is left to 
the sound discretion of the trial court, and on appeal, a trial court's decision will not be 
reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. See State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 
1982). An appellate court will not interfere with the trial court's discretion unless it 
appears that an injustice resulted. See id. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The admission or exclusion of evidence is left to 
the sound discretion of the trial court, and on appeal, a trial court's decision will not be 
reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. See State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 
1982). An appellate court will not interfere with the trial court's discretion unless it 
appears that an injustice resulted. See id. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: On appeal from a summary judgment motion, the 
appellate court reviews the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). 
Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment presents a question of law and the 
appellate court grants no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions and reviews them 
for correctness. See Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235; Stangl v. Ernst Home Center, 948 P.2d 
356, 360 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert 
testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 947 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994); see also Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 347 (Utah 1996). 
Moreover, "[t]he trial court is allowed considerable latitude of discretion in the 
admissibility of expert testimony, and in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, this 
court will not reverse." Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 347 (Utah 1996). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's decision to allow a party to amend 
pleadings is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Westley v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 663 
P.2d 93 (Utah 1983). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's decision to allow a party to amend 
pleadings is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Westley v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 663 
P.2d 93 (Utah 1983). 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102(3)(j). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404: This statute is set forth in the addendum to plaintiffs 
briefattab9. 
3 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-406: This statute is set forth in the addendum to plaintiffs 
brief at tab 9. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a medical malpractice action that was tried to a jury on the sole issue of 
whether plaintiff filed his claimwithin the applicable two-year statute of limitations. The 
only question presented to the jury was whether plaintiff knew of the requisite facts by 
May 6, 2001 to file his claim. If he did, the applicable statute of limitation barred his 
claims. The jury found that plaintiff had not timely filed his action, and he initiated this 
appeal. Although plaintiff has raised numerous issues on appeal the primary issue on 
appeal is whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the law regarding when 
the statute of limitations begins to run on a medical malpractice claim. This brief 
contains a recitation of facts in the section below relevant to the statute of limitations 
issue. In addition, this brief sets forth an extensive recitation of some of the procedural 
details of the case as they relate to several of plaintiff s issues on appeal. 
Facts 
In 2001, plaintiff learned he had stage four colon cancer which had metastasized 
to his bladder, prostate, pelvic walls, and his colon. (R. at 6265: 134, 159; 6266: 234) 
After learning that he had cancer, plaintiff underwent colostomy surgery on January 19, 
2001 to remove as much of the cancerous mass as was possible. (R. at 6265: 134, 160) 
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Dr. Steven Mintz performed that surgery. (R. at 6265: 134, 160) Because Dr. Mintz was 
unable to remove all of the cancer, it was determined that plaintiff needed to undergo 
brachytherapy, external beam radiation, and chemotherapy in order to attack the 
remaining cancer cells.1 (R. at 6265: 134, 148-49, 160; 6266: 234-36) Plaintiff testified 
that he believed this course of treatment would last for about four months, that ultimately 
his colon would be reconnected, and that he could then return to work. (R. at 6266: 235) 
Dr. Hayes' and Gamma West's treatment 
Defendant/Appellee, Dr. Hayes inserted the internal catheters necessary for the 
brachytherapy treatment during the January 19, 2001 colostomy surgery. (R. at 6265: 
135, 161; 6266: 236) Dr. Hayes administered the radiation doses for the brachytherapy 
treatment during a four day period from January 23 through 26, 2001, while plaintiff was 
in Salt Lake Regional Medical Center recovering from the colostomy surgery performed 
by Dr. Mintz. (R. at 6265: 135, 162; 6266: 237) Dr. Hayes only provided treatment from 
January 19, 2001 through January 26, 2001 while plaintiff was at Salt Lake Regional. (R. 
at 6265: 135) After January 26, 2001, plaintiff never saw Dr. Hayes and had no further 
brachytherapy treatments. 
1
 Brachytherapy uses catheters inserted into the body in order to emit radiation treatment 
from the catheters inside the body. In contrast, external beam radiation is just what its 
name suggests: an external radiation beam that targets selected places in the body. 
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Interim between brachytherapy and radiation treatments 
Dr. Mintz discharged plaintiff from Salt Lake Regional on January 26, 2001. (R. 
at 6265: 163) Plaintiff did not complain or indicate any problems or complications as a 
result of the surgery or brachytherapy treatment. (R. at 6265: 135; 6266: 237, 283-84) 
Moreover, Dr. Mintz believed plaintiff was healing properly after the surgery and 
brachytherapy treatment. (R. at 6265: 164) When he was discharged, plaintiff had a mild 
infection of his midline incision from the colostomy surgery, but he had no other open 
wounds. (R. at 6265: 165; 6266: 283-84) 
After discharge, plaintiff saw Dr. Mintz for several follow-up visits to check on 
his progress in recovering from the colostomy surgery. (R. at 6265: 165) Dr. Mintz saw 
plaintiff one time in January, twice in February, and again on March 7, 2001. (R. at 6265: 
165) During each of these visits, plaintiff was healing as Dr. Mintz would have expected, 
and plaintiff did not make any complaints. (R. at 6265: 165) 
External beam radiation treatment at University of Utah 
Beginning on February 20, 2001, plaintiff began external beam radiation 
treatment at the University of Utah medical center. (R. at 6265: 135, 149, 169; 6266: 237) 
This external beam radiation treatment was scheduled to last for a month; however, 
approximately two-thirds of the way through the treatment, plaintiff indicated that he was 
experiencing odd tingling sensations while the treatment was being administered. (R. at 
6265: 135-36, 175-76; 6266: 237) Plaintiff first indicated that he could feel these 
sensations on March 12, 2001. (R. at 6266: 237) He told the radiation technician that he 
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could feel these sensations every time the radiation was administered. (R. at 6265: 136; 
6266: 237, 239) At this time, plaintiff also complained to Dr. Patton that he could feel 
the external beam radiation treatments. (R. at 6266: 244) When plaintiff saw Dr. Mintz 
on March 7, 2001, however, plaintiff did not indicate any problems or complaints. (R. at 
6265: 166, 169) 
On March 15, 2001, a 40 year-old scar from a hernia operation on plaintiffs left 
leg near his hip opened up and started to ooze fluids. (R. at 6265: 136, 149; 6266: 238) 
When the scar opened up unexpectedly, plaintiff and his wife immediately visited their 
family physician, Dr. Allen. (R. at 6265: 136-37; 6266: 239-40) Dr. Allen removed some 
dead skin near the scar, and he referred plaintiff to a different a radiation oncologist, Dr. 
Watson, also at the University of Utah. (R. at 6265: 137, 173; 6266: 288) When plaintiff 
saw Dr. Allen on March 16, 2001, Dr. Allen told plaintiff that he believed the wound 
opening was caused by the radiation treatment. (R. at 6266: 336-37) 
Plaintiff told Dr. Watson that he could feel the external radiation treatment. (R. 
at 6265: 137; 6266: 249) The University decided to stop the external beam treatment, 
and Dr. Watson refered plaintiff back to Dr. Mintz, who performed the initial surgery 
colostomy. (R. at 6265: 137, 149, 172-74; 6266: 249) 
On March 16, 2001, plaintiff went to Dr. Mintz, but Dr. Mintz was out of town 
so plaintiff saw Dr. Mintz's partner, Dr. Christina Richards. (R. at 6265: 138, 150, 170; 
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6266: 250) Dr. Richards removed some more dead skin and indicated that plaintiff 
should come back to see Dr. Mintz. (R. at 6265: 138, 150, 171; 6266: 250). 
Five days later, March 21, 2001, plaintiff returned to see Dr. Mintz. (R. at 6265: 
138, 174) Plaintiff and Dr. Mintz met in Dr. Mintz's office. Dr. Mintz did not treat 
plaintiff, but rather they had a discussion about the open wound. (R. at 6265: 138, 175) 
During this discussion, Dr. Mintz told plaintiff that he believed there was a connection 
between the external beam treatment and the opening of the wound. (R. at 6265: 138, 
177-79, 194-95; 6266: 305-06) Dr. Mintz told plaintiff that brachytherapy works from 
the inside out, whereas the external beam radiation goes from the outside in. Because the 
wound looked like a wound from an external burn, he suggested that the external 
radiation may be the cause of the wound opening. (R. at 6265: 179) 
Following the discussion, Dr. Mintz accompanied plaintiff to Salt Lake Regional 
where he performed surgery on plaintiff s open wound. (R. at 6265: 139, 179-83) In 
addition to performing surgery in order to treat plaintiffs wound, Dr. Mintz also 
indicated that the surgery was performed to determine what caused the scar to open 
unexpectedly. (R. at 6265: 182-83) During the surgery, Dr. Mintz checked the colostomy 
and midline incisions and determined both were doing well. (R. at 6265: 184) Both 
before and after this surgery, Dr. Mintz stated that he talked to plaintiff and his wife 
about the external beam radiation being the cause of the wound. (R. at 6265: 186; 6266: 
305-06) 
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While plaintiff was in Salt Lake Regional, he and his wife complained of the 
dirty and unsanitary conditions at the hospital. (R. at 6265: 139; 6266: 256, 301) Plaintiff 
and his wife believed these conditions exacerbated the problems he was experiencing 
with the wound. (R. at 6265: 139; 6266: 256, 301) 
After plaintiff left Salt Lake Regional, plaintiff and his wife suspected that 
something was wrong and that the open wound and external beam radiation were linked. 
(R. at 6265: 144; 6266: 294-97, 301-02) By mid-March, 2001, plaintiffs wife admitted 
that she believed the wound opening was linked to the external beam radiation. (R. at 
6266: 301-02) In fact, plaintiffs wife took a picture of the wound because she suspected 
that something was wrong and she feared her husband was going to die. (R. at 6265: 144; 
6266: 255, 294-97) On December 1, 2003, plaintiff and his wife initiated an action 
against the University of Utah because they believed the external beam radiation was 
excessive and improper. (R. at 6266: 299-300) 
After the external beam radiation treatment was stopped plaintiffs wound began 
to heal after Dr. Mintz's surgery. (R. at 6265: 144, 151, 187) After 33 days of no 
external beam radiation, the wound healed to the point where plaintiffs oncology doctors 
believed he could resume the external beam radiation treatments. (R. at 6265: 144, 151, 
187-88; 6266: 258) Before resuming the radiation treatment, however, plaintiff discussed 
with Dr. Mintz the concerns he had about restarting the external beam radiation. (R. at 
6265:189) 
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On April 17, 2001, plaintiff resumed his external beam radiation treatment at the 
University of Utah. (R. at 6265: 144, 151) The external beam radiation treatment 
concluded on April 26, 2001. (R. at 6265: 144, 151). During this second round of 
external beam radiation, plaintiff indicated that he had the same tingling sensations he 
had experienced during the February and March treatments. (R. at 6266: 259) 
On May 3, 2001, plaintiff again complained of sensations in his left hip during 
the external beam radiation treatments. (R. at 6265: 144, 190; 6266: 259, 403-05) 
Plaintiff made these complaints to Dr. Mintz and to Dr. Patton at the University of Utah. 
(R. at 6265: 190-91; 6266: 260, 263) The jury heard this evidence and was asked to 
determine whether plaintiff had the requisite knowledge as of May 6, 2001 to trigger the 
applicable two-year statute of limitations on a medical malpractice claim. 
Procedural Details of Case 
Jury Instructions 
Plaintiff has argued that the trial court did not properly instruct the jury on 
negligence and the definition of cause in fact or legal cause. Procedurally, this issue was 
raised before the trial started, but it was not conclusively resolved until near the end of 
the trial. (R. at 6265: 5-6). Plaintiff argued that knowledge of general negligence was not 
sufficient to trigger the running of the statute of limitations, but rather, plaintiff had to 
have knowledge of the cause in fact of his injury. (Id.) Prior to jury selection, the trial 
court reserved its ruling on this issue. (R. at 6265: 6-8) After the jury was selected but 
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before opening statements, the trial court again stated that it was reserving its ruling on 
this issue and clarified what would be permissible for the parties to discuss during 
opening statements to jury. (R. at 6265: 121-26) 
During the lunch break on the second day of trial and then later in the day after 
the jury was excused, the parties presented arguments regarding jury instructions. (R. at 
6266: 381-401, 434-459, 471-489) During these arguments, plaintiff objected to 
defendants' proposed instruction that discussed the Foil test, and the trial court agreed 
with plaintiffs objection and removed the instruction. (R. at 6266: 394-95) Plaintiff also 
objected to instruction number 24 because it contained the language "or may be 
attributable to." (R. at 6266:396-97)2 The trial court overruled plaintiffs objection to 
this instruction; however, this instruction was not identified in plaintiffs brief as being in 
error. The trial court ended the discussion at this point, and it indicated that plaintiff 
would have the opportunity to make further objections later. (R. at 6266: 401) 
Later, plaintiffs counsel objected to instruction number 22 (R. at 6060), and this 
objection led to a change to instructions numbers 22 and 23. (R. at 6060-61; 6266: 434-
In the transcript, the reference is to instruction number 23; however, the instructions are 
renumbered before being given to the jury. Thus, the discussion of instruction number 23 
in the transcript of the hearing refers to instruction 24 that was given to the jury. The 
instruction numbers in the hearing transcript are one less than the number of the 
instructions as numbered and given to the jury. All references to the instructions in this 
brief will be to the instructions as numbered when given to the jury. These numbered 
instructions are located at pages 6060-6064 of the record. 
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38). With these changes to instructions 22 and 23, plaintiff then stipulated to these two 
instructions. (R. at 6060-61; 6266: 438). 
Next, plaintiff addressed instruction number 24. (R. at 6062; 6266: 438) 
Plaintiffs objection to instruction number 24 was that it did not discuss cause or cause in 
fact. (R. at 6266: 439) Specifically, plaintiff refered to MUJI 6.37 and argued that it 
required a plaintiff to have knowledge of "a physical injury, its cause, and the possibility 
of negligence." (R. at 6266: 439) Although instruction number 24 addressed knowledge 
of an injury and negligence, plaintiff argued it omitted any discussion of cause. (Id.) 
Plaintiff further objected to instruction number 24 because it did not address legal cause. 
(R. at 6266: 441) 
Plaintiff argued that the jury needed to be instructed as to the definition of 
negligence. (Id.) Plaintiff requested that the jury be instructed on the elements or 
components of negligence in order to understand legal cause. (R. at 6266: 441-43) After 
hearing plaintiffs objections, the trial court asked defendants if they would object to a 
jury instruction that defined negligence for the jury. (R. at 6266: 443, 446-47) 
Defendants objected to defining negligence to the jury and cited to case law that sets 
forth that proximate cause is not relevant to the determination of when a plaintiff has 
sufficient knowledge to trigger that statute of limitations. (R. at 6266: 447-49). Plaintiff 
then argued again that the jury needed to be instructed on the definition of negligence. (R. 
at 6266: 449-50) Plaintiff also argued that instruction 25 referred to negligence to further 
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his argument that the jury needed to have negligence defined. (R. at 6266: 451-53, 454-
55) The argument ended with the trial court reserving its ruling on whether to instruct the 
jury on the definition of negligence as plaintiff requested. (R. at 6266: 458) 
Plaintiff also requested his own special instructions, which were numbered 4 and 
5 on the issues of cause in fact and legal cause. (R. at 6266: 475) With respect to these 
instructions, however, plaintiff acknowledged that any objection to these instructions not 
being given would be premature until the trial court decided how it would instruct the 
jury on the issue of negligence with respect to instructions 24 and 25. (R. at 6266: 475) 
Late in the day and after hearing the parties' arguments, the trial court ruled that 
it would not define negligence for the jury and gave plaintiff an opportunity to object to 
this ruling. (R. at 6266: 477) Plaintiff indicated that the definition of negligence was the 
crux of the case. (R. at 6266: 478) After the trial court further clarified its ruling, the trial 
court adjourned for the night. (R. at 6266: 486-89) 
When the court came back in session the next morning, the trial court informed 
the parties that it decided to give an instruction on negligence as plaintiff requested. 
Thus, the trial court gave the parties instruction 26, which defined negligence. (R. at 
6064, 6267: 492-93) After the trial court noted defendants' objection to the proposed 
negligence instruction and provided some clarification on its ruling, plaintiffs counsel 
stated: "I would just say that that is - I'm pleased with that instruction. I'd rather have 
had the ones that we proffered, but I think that all of his worries are taken care of by your 
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instruction that says you don't need to know the identity of the party . . . . " (R. at 6267: 
497). Accordingly, based on the trial court's decision to give instruction 26, plaintiff 
stipulated to instructions 24 and 25 and withdrew his request for his special instructions 4 
and 5. 
Voir Dire 
Plaintiff requested the trial court to question the jury panel regarding "insurance 
claims adjusting" and "risk management." (R. at 6264: 29) When the trial court first had 
preliminary discussions regarding voir dire questions, the trial court indicated it would 
"get to that on the day of trial and we'll do that quickly " (R. at 6264: 29-30) Each 
potential juror was given written questionnaires, which the jurors answered and counsel 
reviewed before jury selection. (R. at 6265: 8-9) Plaintiff did not object to the questions 
submitted to the jury or the court's handling of the written jury questionnaires. Prior to 
bringing the jury into the courtroom, the trial court reiterated: "We'll bring up the jury. 
You've stipulated to the voir dire, essentially. There are a few questions that you hadn't 
agreed on, but I'll resolve those." (R. at 6265: 9) After the jury was brought in, the trial 
court further questioned the jury. (R. at 6265: 17-121) During this questioning, plaintiff 
never objected to any of the questions that were asked, and plaintiff never objected that 
the trial court failed to ask any of his proposed questions. (R. at 6265: 17-121) Plaintiff 
never requested the trial court to ask the jury about insurance claims adjusting or risk 
management, and plaintiff never requested a ruling from the trial court while it was 
questioning the jury. (R. at 6265: 17-121) 
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Supplementation of Dr. Kadish's testimony 
Plaintiff submitted initial Rule 26 Disclosures on June 21, 2004. (R. at 3425) 
Plaintiff then provided Supplemental Rule 26 Disclosures on September 15, 2006, which 
supplemented both plaintiffs initial disclosures and his discovery responses of December 
22, 2005. (R. at 3425) Finally, plaintiff made further supplemental Rule 26 Disclosures 
on November 10, 2006, which again supplemented both plaintiffs initial disclosures and 
his discovery responses. (R. at 3425) 
Defendants first deposed plaintiffs expert witness, Dr. Kadish, on May 26, 2006 
in Boston, Massachusetts. During that deposition, plaintiff indicated that she had not sent 
certain materials to the expert witness — such as the deposition of the plaintiff and the 
second deposition of Dr. Chidester. Plaintiff, however, stated his intent to provide this 
material for Dr. Kadish to review. (R. at 3425-29) Based on plaintiffs representations 
that he would provide Dr. Kadish additional materials to review, defendants reserved 
their right to come back and depose Dr. Kadish on this additional information. (R. at 
3425-29) 
Dr. Kadish was sent additional materials, and defendants then had to re-depose 
him on September 18, 2006. (R. at 3425-29, 3470-76) After the second deposition of Dr. 
Kadish in September 2006, plaintiffs sent supplemental disclosures in November which 
significantly altered Dr. Kadish's opinions. Similarly, plaintiffs expert witnesses, Frank 
Ascoli, whose opinions operated in conjunction with Dr. Kadish, was also deposed two 
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times because of the supplemental material provided to Dr. Kadish. Mr. Ascoli was 
deposed in May and again in October 2006. 
Because plaintiff had already supplemented his discovery responses and 
necessitated a second round of expert deposition, defendants opposed plaintiffs third 
attempt to supplement his discovery responses. Defendants opposed these 
supplementations because plaintiff had already supplemented his response, necessitating 
a second round of expert depositions and because plaintiff should not be allowed a third 
bite at the apple. (R. at 3430-32) 
Disposition of the case below 
This case was tried to a jury over three days. The parties agreed that May 6, 2001 
was the cutoff date, and the jury was asked to answer a special interrogatory regarding 
whether plaintiff knew of the requisite facts to trigger the statute of limitations on or 
before May 6, 2001. The jury answered this question in the affirmative. Plaintiff 
initiated this appeal from the jury's finding that his complaint was not timely filed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Many of plaintiff s arguments on appeal are not adequately preserved or 
presented. Specifically, many of plaintiff s arguments set forth a general discussion of 
plaintiffs view of the law without being tied to a trial court ruling or instructions to the 
jury. In other words, plaintiff does not adequately demonstrate which rulings were in 
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error and how the ruling is contrary to established law. Furthermore, plaintiff makes no 
attempt to demonstrate how the claimed error would change the outcome of the trial. 
The dispositive issue in this case is whether the trial court properly instructed the 
jury as to the law on when the two-year statute of limitations began to run on plaintiffs 
claims. The parties stipulated that May 6, 2001 was the cutoff date, and accordingly, the 
jury was asked to determine whether plaintiff had the requisite knowledge as of this date. 
The jury concluded that plaintiff did have this knowledge, and thus, plaintiffs claims 
were time-barred. The evidence at trial amply supports the jury's determination that 
plaintiff had the requisite knowledge before May 6, 2001. 
Plaintiff has listed seven issues on appeal. If this Court determines, however, 
that plaintiff has failed to preserve his challenge to the jury instructions, that plaintiff 
failed to properly present his argument that the jury instructions were in error, or that the 
trial court properly instructed the jury as to the applicable law on the medical malpractice 
statute of limitations, the Court need not review the remaining six issues on appeal. A 
determination that the jury was properly instructed or that the issue is not reviewable on 
appeal would render the remaining issues moot. If plaintiff failed to meet the applicable 
two-year statute of limitations, the Court's ruling on the following issues would not 
resurrect plaintiff s claims. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The jury instructions were proper, and plaintiff has not identified any 
instructions that were incorrect or demonstrated how a different instruction 
would lead to a different result. 
a. Plaintiff did not preserve this issue for appeal, and he has not properly 
presented these arguments on appeal. 
Plaintiff failed to preserve or properly present his claimed errors with respect to 
the trial court's instructions to the jury. "If an appellant fails to allege specific errors of 
the lower court, the appellate court will not seek out errors in the lower court's decision." 
Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, f7, 194 P.3d 903. Although plaintiff claims the trial court 
erred in instructing the jury as to the applicable law, plaintiffs brief does not identify the 
specific instruction given to the jury that was incorrect, nor does he identify a specific 
proposed jury instruction that was not given to the jury. 
/. Not preserved 
Plaintiff did not preserve his objections to the jury instructions because the trial 
court made plaintiffs requested changes and he stipulated to the instructions that were 
given. Plaintiff argues the trial court erred in failing to provide cause in fact or legal 
injury instruction. The trial court, however, ultimately decided to give the jury an 
instruction that defined negligence. Plaintiff did not object to the trial courf s negligence 
instruction or request any further instruction on negligence or cause in fact. Rather, after 
the trial court indicated it would give an instruction, plaintiffs counsel stated: "I would 
just say that that is - I'm pleased with that instruction. I'd rather have had the ones that 
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we proffered, but I think that all of his [Dr. Hayes'] worries are taken care of by your 
instruction that says you don't need to know the identity of the party . . . ." (R. at 6267: 
497). 
Because the trial court gave a negligence instruction and plaintiff agreed it was a 
proper instruction, plaintiff invited the alleged error and has waived this argument on 
appeal. "[W]e will not reverse a jury verdict on legally sound grounds, particularly 
where the complaining party essentially invited the alleged error by failing to avail itself 
of the opportunity - offered at trial - to avoid such error." Cheves, 1999 UT 86 at TJ20. 
"[A] party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the 
trial court into committing the error." Id. Plaintiff has not argued that this Court should 
review the instructions under a manifest injustice exception; however, the Court of 
Appeals has noted: "if counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to 
the court that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction, we will not review the 
instruction under the manifest injustice exception." State v. Chavez-Espinoza^ 2008 UT 
App 191, f 11, 186 P.3d 1023. The record clearly indicates that plaintiff stipulated to 
instructions 22 and 23. (R. at 6266:438) Later, plaintiff stipulated that instruction 26 
eliminated his objection to instructions 24 and 25. (R. at 6267: 497). Also, instruction 26 
eliminated the need for his proposed special instructions 4 and 5. 
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ii. Plaintiff/ailed to identify which instructions were incorrect. 
In addition to failing to preserve this issue on appeal, plaintiff does not argue 
which instructions were inaccurate or which omitted instructions should have been given 
to the jury. Rather, plaintiff broadly argues what he believes the applicable law is, but his 
brief fails to compare his understanding of the law with the jury instructions in the record. 
Devoid of this detailed analysis, plaintiffs brief improperly shifts the burden to 
defendants and this Court to compare plaintiffs broad legal arguments in his brief with 
the instructions given to the jury. "[T]o reverse a trial verdict, this court must find not a 
mere possibility, but a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the result." Cheves v. 
Williams, 1999 UT 86, |20, 993 P.2d 191. In other words, plaintiff must demonstrate 
both that the instructions were inaccurate and that there was a reasonable likelihood of a 
different result. See id.; see also Haupt v. Heaps, 2005 UT App 436, ^38, 131 P.3d 252. 
Under this standard, plaintiff was required to identify the specific instruction that 
was in error, demonstrate how the instruction conflicts with Utah law, and then 
demonstrate that a different result would have been achieved absent the error. Plaintiff 
has done none of this. In fact, the trial courf s instructions accurately reflected Utah law, 
and plaintiff cannot point to any instructions that were in error. 
Moreover, assuming the instructions were in error, plaintiff has not demonstrated 
that a different result would have been achieved. The jury was asked to determine if 
plaintiff had knowledge prior to May 6, 2001 of the facts necessary to initiate a medical 
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malpractice claim. The evidence at trial demonstrated that plaintiff and his wife were 
well aware of the problems he was experiencing during the external beam radiation 
treatments and that plaintiff was aware that these problems may be due to negligence. 
Also, it is critical to note that Dr. Hayes had nothing to do with the external beam 
radiation. Plaintiffs had no complaint during or after his brachytherapy treatments. 
Plaintiff only began complaining during the external beam radiation. 
In addition, these problems were contrary to plaintiffs own expectations for the 
course of treatment. In this case, plaintiff was aware of the tingling sensations during the 
external beam radiation treatment, was aware that a 40 year-old scar had suddenly and 
unexpectedly opened, and was aware that he was not healing or progressing as he had 
expected. In Collins v. Wilson, this Court addressed similar facts and concluded that 
these facts should have put the plaintiff on notice of a possible cause of action. See id., 
1999 UT 56,1J18, 984 P.2d 960. Specifically, in Collins, this Court noted that the 
plaintiff and his wife suspected that something was wrong, that the plaintiff knew he was 
suffering complications immediately after the medical procedure, and that these 
complications were all contrary to his expectations. See id. 
Like Collins, plaintiff and his wife testified that they suspected something was 
wrong and went so far as to document the problem with a photograph. Plaintiff testified 
that he complained to a doctor and the radiation technician about the tingling sensation 
during the external beam radiation procedures. Plaintiff knew he had to return to his 
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colostomy surgeon and underwent an additional, unplanned surgery on a wound that had 
not bothered him for 40 years. Plaintiff expected to be healed and ready for work in four 
months - neither of which happened. Finally, plaintiffs own doctors, Dr. Mintz, and Dr. 
Allen told plaintiff that the injury and the external beam radiation were linked. Plaintiff 
was aware of all of these facts before May 6, 2001. Because this was the date the parties 
agreed was the cutoff date and because the evidence presented to the jury demonstrated 
this knowledge by the cutoff date, plaintiff cannot show how a different set of jury 
instructions would lead to a different outcome on whether he met the applicable two-year 
statute of limitations. 
b. Trial court's instructions accurately reflected Utah law. 
Assuming plaintiff adequately preserved and presented this issue on appeal, the 
trial court's jury instructions properly instructed the jury on Utah law on the statute of 
limitations in a medical malpractice case. The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
provides: "A malpractice action against a health care provider shall be commenced 
within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable 
diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs . . . ." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-3-404(l). The term "injury" as used in this act has been interpreted to mean 
legal injury. See Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979). In turn, legal injury 
has been interpreted to require that a plaintiff "knew or should have known that he had 
sustained an injury and that the injury was caused by negligent action." Id. Accordingly, 
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in order to reverse the jury's verdict, plaintiff must demonstrate that the trial court's 
instructions did not accurately reflect this law. 
The three jury instructions that addressed this standard were instructions 23, 24, 
and 25. These three instructions properly instructed the jury as to applicable statute of 
limitations and the requisite knowledge that a plaintiff must have in order to trigger the 
running of the statute of limitations. These instructions are located at pages 6061-63 of 
the record. In addition, the instructions are provided in the Addendum to this brief along 
with citations to the supporting authority for each instruction super-imposed onto the 
actual instructions from the record. 
Instruction 23 
Instruction 23 is a general recitation of the language directly from the statute. The 
critical portion of instruction 23 states: "You must determine whether the Plaintiff knew 
or should have know, through the use of reasonable diligence, on or before May 6, 2001, 
that he had suffered an injury and that the injury may be attributable to negligence." (R. 
at 6061) The parties had stipulated to May 6, 2001 as being the cutoff date. The 
remaining points of the critical portion of this instruction directly track the statutory 
language and subsequent interpretation of the statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-
404(1); Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979); Hove v. McMaster, 621 P.2d 
694, 697 (Utah 1980); Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471, 473-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The statute and these cases definitively establish that the plaintiff must be aware of an 
injury and that the injury may be attributable to negligence in order to trigger the statute 
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of limitations. See id. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in giving the jury 
instruction number 23. 
Instruction 24 
Instruction 24 further clarifies instruction 23 and what is the requisite knowledge 
of negligence in order to trigger the statute of limitations. The critical portion of 
instruction 24 states: "An individual does not need certain knowledge of negligence in 
order to 'discover' his injury. Instead, all that is necessary is that the plaintiff recognize 
the possibility that the injury was caused by negligence." (R. at 6062) Thus, instruction 
24 focuses on the second prong of the Foil test, knowledge that the injury is tied to 
negligence. See Foil, 601 P.2d at 148. Those opinions addressing the second prong of 
Foil have uniformly held that a plaintiff does not need confirmation of legal or actual 
negligence, but rather only those facts "that would lead a reasonable person to conclude 
that he may have a cause of action against a health care provider." Hargett v. Limberg, 
598 F. Supp. 152, 155 (D. Utah 1984), rev'don other grounds, 801 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 
1986); see also Deschamps, 784 P.2d at 473-75. 
In Deschamps, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed and rejected plaintiffs 
arguments that he must have knowledge of the cause in fact of the injury and that the jury 
should have been instructed as to the elements of negligence and cause in fact. See 
Deschamps, 784 P.2d at 473-75. In that case, the plaintiff argued that she could not 
discover her legal injury until she consulted with a lawyer because the physicians that she 
consulted with told her that her claims were not legally actionable. See id. at 474. 
24 
Affirming the trial court, the court of appeals stated: "her position confused iegal injury' 
with a legal conclusion of negligence." Id. The court of appeals went on to confirm that 
only a general knowledge that the injury may have been caused by negligence is 
necessary. See id. Because instruction 24 accurately reflects the law as set forth in Foil, 
Deschamps, and Hargett, the trial court did not err in providing this instruction to the 
jury. 
Instruction 25 
Finally, instruction 25 accurately discusses whether the plaintiff is required to 
know the identity of the tortfeasor. Instruction 25 in full states: "An injured person need 
not determine the identity of the person responsible for his injury to determine that he has 
been injured and that the injury was possibly tied to negligence." (R. at 6063) This 
instruction is taken almost verbatim from a court of appeals decision. See McDougal v. 
Weed, 945 P.2d 175, 177-78 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In McDougal, the plaintiff initiated a 
claim against the wrong doctor. See id. at 176. The plaintiff did not add the correct 
doctor until after the statute of limitations had run. The trial court granted the second 
doctor's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff argued the statute was 
tolled until discovery of both the legal injury and the defendant's identity. See id. 
Rejecting the plaintiffs argument, the court of appeals stated: "we hold that the medical 
malpractice statute of limitations is tied only to the discovery of the plaintiffs legal 
injury and not to the discovery of the tortfeasor's identity." Id. at 178. Accordingly, 
instruction 25 accurately reflected Utah law and was properly submitted to the jury. 
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Instructions 22 and 26 
The only other instructions provided to the jury that were not the trial court's stock 
jury instructions were instructions 22 and 26. (R. at 6060, 6064) Plaintiff has not argued 
that instruction 22, which defines what a statute of limitations is, was in error. 
Accordingly, the trial court properly provided instruction 22. 
Similarly, plaintiff requested an instruction on the definition of negligence. After 
initially rejecting plaintiffs request to have a negligence instruction, the trial court 
changed its mind and indicated that it would give the jury instruction 26. (R. at 6267: 
492-497) Defendants twice objected to this instruction as being contrary to the statute 
and case law. (R. at 6266: 447-49; 6267: 497) Nonetheless, the trial court decided to give 
instruction 26. After the trial court announced that it would give instruction 26, 
plaintiffs counsel stated: "I would just say that that is - I'm pleased with that 
instruction. I'd rather have had the ones that we proffered, but I think that all of his 
worries are taken care of by your instruction that says you don't need to know the identity 
of the party [instruction 25] . . . ." (R. at 6267: 497). Accordingly, plaintiff has not 
argued that instruction 26 was in error, and in fact, plaintiff told the trial court that he was 
pleased with the instruction. Indeed, through this statement, plaintiff stipulated to 
instructions 24, 25 and 26. 
In summary, the trial court provided the jury with instructions that accurately 
reflected Utah law. Plaintiff failed to object to any of the proposed instructions and 
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stipulated to all of them. Finally, on appeal, plaintiff has not provided this Court with 
any instructions that the trial court improperly omitted. 
II. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing defendants to use 
plaintiffs pleadings to impeach his testimony at trial. 
The trial court's decision to allow defendants to use plaintiffs first complaint at 
trial was proper and well within the trial court's considerable discretion. See State v. 
McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982). The trial court's decision to admit or exclude 
evidence at trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The trial court did not err because a 
party's superseded pleadings may be used for the limited purpose of impeaching 
contradictory testimony or to refresh a witness's recollection. The Utah Supreme Court 
has stated: "when an admission or statement is contained in a pleading which is 
superseded by another pleading, the facts or admissions contained in the superseded 
pleading may, in most jurisdictions, including our own, be used as evidence against the 
party who made the statements or admissions." Toone v. J.P. O'Neill Const. Co., 40 
Utah 265, 121 P. 10, 14 (1912); see also 29A Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 792 (stating general 
rule is that superseded or abandoned pleading is admissible evidence). This rule contains 
two important safeguards that were present in this case in order to avoid binding a party 
unfairly to an early admission or statement in a pleading. See, e.g., Winn v. Romney, 63 
Utah 120, 222 P. 709, 713 (1923). First, the general rule pertains to superseded or 
abandoned pleadings. See Toone, 121 P. at 14. Second, when the pleading is introduced, 
the party against whom it is used must be allowed the opportunity to deny or explain the 
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admission or statement in the pleading. See id. (use of appellant's answer was in error 
where the admission was not in a superseded pleading and where the admission was used 
as alternative affirmative defense of contributory negligence which party was not allowed 
to explain). 
In this case, the trial court allowed defendants to use the first complaint for a 
limited purpose of impeachment of inconsistent testimony. Defendants questioned 
plaintiff about the allegations in his first complaint that included additional defendants. 
In allowing the use of evidence for this purpose, a party is free to dispute or deny the 
veracity of unverified pleadings. If the information in the pleadings was incorrect, 
plaintiff could have easily denied that the complaint was accurate. Moreover, if plaintiff 
had denied the facts were accurate, defendants would have been stuck with his denial. As 
it turns out, however, plaintiff did not deny that the facts were accurate. Instead when 
questioned, plaintiff confirmed the facts were accurate. (R. at 6266: 244, 248) 
Finally, although the complaint was unverified, plaintiff had provided an affidavit 
under oath. This affidavit corroborated some of the facts in the unverified complaint. 
Accordingly, defendants were entitled to cross-examine plaintiff with his pleadings and 
affidavit in order to determine when he knew certain facts regarding his injuries. The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this evidence to come in at trial for the 
purposes of impeachment and to refresh the witness's memory. 
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III. The trial court properly conducted jury voir dire, and it properly exercised 
its discretion in precluding plaintiff from offering evidence of insurance at 
trial. 
Plaintiff argues two separate points under this issue. First, plaintiff argues the 
trial court erred in not questioning the jury as to claims adjusting or risk management. 
Second, plaintiff argues the trial court impermissibly precluded him from questioning 
certain witnesses regarding membership in an insurance cooperative. 
Jury Questions'. 
i. Failure to preserve. 
Plaintiff failed to preserve an appeal of the issue of whether the trial court erred 
in failing to question the jury. When the issue of questions to the jury panel was raised, 
the trial court twice reserved its ruling on the issue until the time when it conducted the 
voir dire. (R. at 6264: 29-30; 6265: 8-9) When the trial court conducted the voir dire, 
plaintiff never objected to the questions that were asked, never requested additional 
questions, and never objected that requested questions were not asked. (R. at 6265: 17-
121) Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to preserve any argument that the trial court 
improperly conducted its voir dire of the jury panel. 
ii. Trial court adequately questioned the jury panel. 
The trial court fully questioned the jury panel regarding its perception of 
healthcare, tort reform, and medical malpractice actions. In fact, the trial court 
extensively questioned the jury and elicited the necessary responses to allow counsel to 
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select a jury. In Alcazar v. University of Utah Hospitals & Clinics, the court of appeals 
reversed a trial because the trial court failed to ask the jury several requested questions 
designed to determine potential juror bias against medical malpractice actions. See id., 
2008 UT App 222,188 P.3d 490. In Alcazar, the trial court declined to ask seven of the 
plaintiffs proposed questions. See id. at J^5. These questions focused broadly on public 
perception of personal injury and medical malpractice actions and public perception of 
how these actions affected insurance premiums and coverage. See id. The court of 
appeals concluded the trial court's failure to ask these questions prevented the plaintiffs 
from having "an opportunity to 'determine which, if any, prospective jurors had been 
exposed to tort reform propaganda, much less whether that exposure produced hidden or 
subconscious biases affecting the jurors5 ability to render a fair and impartial verdict."5 
Id. (citations omitted). 
In contrast, the only question the trial court did not ask was whether any of the 
jurors had experience in claims adjusting or risk management. The trial court required 
each juror to answer, in writing, questions about medical malpractice lawsuits, tort 
reform, and "lawsuit crisis." (R. at 6016) It required jurors to answer a question about 
feelings towards lawsuits against doctors. (R. at 6016) It requested jurors to answer 
questions about lawsuits in general and whether a lawsuit was an appropriate method for 
resolving disputes. (R. at 6016) Finally, it asked jurors if they, or their family, worked in 
healthcare or legal professions. (R. at 6016) 
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In addition to these written questions, the trial court followed up and extensively 
questioned the jurors the morning of trial. The trial court asked the jurors if they, or their 
family, had ever received negligent medical treatment. (R. at 6265: 27) The trial court 
asked the jurors if their own medical background would predispose them in any particular 
direction in this case (R. at 6265: 32-33) The trial court then asked whether any members 
of the jury had been involved in a medical malpractice case. (R. at 6265: 34) The trial 
court asked general follow up questions regarding whether the jurors were in the 
healthcare or legal professions and their attitudes towards lawsuits. (R. at 6265: 37-47) 
Finally, the trial court asked the jurors about their experiences with cancer (R. at 6265: 
47), radiation treatment for cancer (R. at 6265: 49); and any problems initiating a lawsuit 
because of a statute of limitations (R. at 6265: 68). 
Based on the questions asked and plaintiffs failure to object to the questions 
asked or omitted, the trial court properly conducted voir dire of the prospective jurors. 
The trial court thoroughly explored possible juror biases through a preliminary written 
questionnaire, which the parties stipulated to its contents, and through follow up 
questions before trial. If plaintiff believed the voir dire was insufficient, plaintiff had an 
obligation to object and to raise the issue before the trial court. Plaintiff failed to do this. 
Evidence of insurance to show bias: 
Plaintiff argues that because Dr. Hayes, Dr. Mintz, and Dr. Watson are members 
of a reciprocal insurance exchange, they would not testify truthfully or completely at 
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trial. Plaintiff provided no evidence to support that conclusion, but merely sought 
admission of the insurance information under Rule 411 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Although Rule 411 permits introduction of insurance as evidence of bias in limited 
circumstances, Rule 411 does not mandate admission. Admissibility remains subject to 
the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect under Rule 403 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. Courts which have addressed this issue squarely in the context of 
medical malpractice litigation have held that (1) admissibility requires a substantial 
connection to the insurance company, and (2) absent other evidence of bias, the danger of 
unfair prejudice far outweighs the probative value of the information on the issue of bias. 
Specifically, one court stated: "Virtually every jurisdiction has nevertheless concluded 
that mere policyholder status represents too attenuated a "connection" with an insurance 
company, mutual or otherwise, for the probative value of such evidence to outweigh the 
potential prejudice to the jury's deliberations." Warren v. Jackson, 479 S.E.2d 278 281-
82 (N.C. App. 1997) (emphasis added, citations omitted). 
Similarly, another court noted that the connection must be akin to agency, 
employment, or control as opposed to mere membership in an insurance plan. See 
Vasquez v. Rocco, 836 A.2d 1158 (Conn. 2003). Those in which the connection to the 
insurer was sufficient to allow the introduction of evidence went well beyond mere 
membership in a common insurance program. See, e.g. Evans v. Colorado Permanente 
Medical Group, 902 P.2d 867, 874 (Colo. App. 1995); Yoho v. Thompson, 548 S.E. 2d 
584 (S.C. 2001). 
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In a medical malpractice case involving an insurance exchange similar to the one 
at issue here, an Illinois appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that evidence of 
insurance to demonstrate bias was inadmissible under Rule 403. See Golden v. 
Kishwaukee Comm. Health Serv. Ctr., Inc., 645 N.E.2d 319 (111. App. 1994). In Golden, 
several of the defendant physicians and six of their expert witnesses were all insured by 
the same medical insurance exchange. See id. at 319-20. The trial court found that the 
evidence was probative, but that the possibility of prejudice outweighed the probative 
value and excluded the evidence. See id. at 320. The appellate court identified the issue 
as one of first impression and held that the exclusion was an appropriate exercise of 
discretion "in the absence of any showing of how many mutual members are associated in 
the Exchange or any explanation of how or to what extent individual members would 
profit in the event of a favorable decision." Id. 
Other courts have reached the same result. In Mendooza v. Varon, 563 S.W.2d 
646, 649 (Tex. App. 1978), the court noted that the remote possibility that other 
physicians' insurance rates would be affected by a judgment against the defendant was 
insufficient to outweigh the prejudice arising from admitting the insurance information. 
Plaintiff here presents no evidence that Dr. Mintz or Dr. Watson are biased in 
any way. He simply wanted to rely on Rule 411 to create a presumption of bias arising 
from common membership in an insurance exchange. The majority position is that it 
takes more than mere membership in a common insurance exchange to make evidence of 
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insurance admissible. Accordingly, the trial court properly exercised its sound discretion 
in precluding evidence of insurance at trial. 
IV. The trial court properly granted defendants' motion for partial summary 
judgment as to plaintiffs claim for punitive damages. 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint failed to allege any facts on which a finder of 
fact could properly base an award of punitive damages against defendants Gamma West 
Brachytherapy or Dr. John Hayes, and thus, the trial court correctly granted defendants' 
motion for partial summary judgment. Under Utah law, punitive damages may be 
awarded directly against a defendant upon a showing: (1) by clear and convincing 
evidence (2) that Gamma West Brachytherapy and/or Dr. John Hayes engaged in 
fraudulent conduct that was either "willful and malicious" or conduct manifesting both a 
"knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the rights of others." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-18-l(l)(a) (emphasis added). In this case, plaintiff failed to assert any 
facts or causes of action which would have justified an award of punitive damages. 
The Acf s combined requirements of a high degree of wrongful conduct and 
knowledge by a tortfeasor of the wrongful and harmful nature of such conduct were 
specifically crafted to reflect the Utah legislature's belief that only truly culpable conduct 
should be punished. Indeed, the Legislature drafted the Act in plain terms to make clear 
that even reckless conduct, by itself, does not warrant the imposition of punitive 
damages. Utah appellate courts have also commonly held that "[p]unitive damages are 
not awarded for mere inadvertence, mistake, errors of judgment and the like which 
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constitute ordinary negligence/' Behrens v. Raleigh, 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983) 
(citation omitted). "[Ordinary] negligence will never suffice as a basis upon which 
punitive damages may be awarded." Id. In order for defendants' conduct to constitute 
negligence that warrants punitive damages, plaintiff must prove with clear and 
convincing evidence that: 
(1) Defendants knew that their conduct would, in a high 
degree of probability, result in substantial harm to another, 
and the Defendants' conduct was highly unreasonable; or 
(2) Defendants' conduct was an extreme departure from 
ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is 
apparent. 
Id. at 1187. 
Plaintiffs asserted facts did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that 
defendants' conduct justified a punitive damages award. Plaintiffs claim for punitive 
damages was based on plaintiffs first cause of action for gross negligence. Under Utah 
law, "gross negligence is the failure to observe even slight care; it is carelessness or 
recklessness to a degree that shows utter indifference to the consequences that may 
result." Atkin v. Mountain States Tel., 709 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah 1985) (citing Robinson 
Ins. v. Southwestern Bell, 366 F.Supp. 307, 311 (W.D.Ark. 1973)). Gross negligence 
requires proof of something more than a lack of ordinary care, but less than willful 
misconduct, which "goes beyond gross negligence in that a defendant must be aware that 
his conduct will probably result in injury." Id. The cause of action for gross negligence, 
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as stated in plaintiffs complaint, did not support a claim for punitive damages. See, e.g., 
Smith v. Fairfax Realty, 82 P.3d 1064 (Utah 2003) (stating that punitive damages are 
available only upon clear and convincing proof of a knowing and reckless indifference 
toward the rights of others). As such, the trial court properly granted defendants' motion 
for partial summary judgment because plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts to show a 
knowing and reckless indifference in order to justify an award of punitive damages. 
V. The trial court properly exercised its considerable discretion in precluding 
plaintiffs expert's supplemental opinions. 
The trial court properly excluded plaintiffs supplemental disclosures as 
untimely and prejudicial because the supplement disclosures attempted to change 
plaintiffs theory of his case and his expert's opinions during the late stages of the case, 
rather than to simply supplement the categories of information required under Rule 
26(a)(1). 
Plaintiff relies upon the last sentence of Rule 26(e)(1) to argue that the 
supplemental Rule 26 Disclosures are a proper method to supplement, change, and/or 
revise expert opinions and theories of the case. This is clearly not what supplementing 
Rule 26(a) initial disclosures was intended to address. Moreover, this last sentence 
applies only where an expert was required to provide a report, which was not required in 
this case. Even then, it was not intended to allow plaintiff to continually supplement and 
change the opinions and testimony of experts. The trial court properly exercised its 
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discretion in refusing to allow plaintiff to repeatedly alter his case in response to the 
approach that defendants were taking in this case. 
Under the scheduling order, the time to designate experts had long since passed 
when plaintiff attempted to supplement. The trial court properly concluded that plaintiff 
should not be allowed to use supplemental initial disclosures as a backdoor attempt to 
change expert testimony or opinion in this case where plaintiffs experts had already been 
deposed a second time as a result of prior changes in opinion. One obvious result of 
allowing this type of reverse engineering of the case was that it would significantly delay 
the case and cost substantial sums of money, as the defendants would need to re-depose 
all experts, then have their experts re-examine the new and changed opinions, and then let 
plaintiff re-depose the defense experts. 
Defendants had deposed both Dr. Kadish and Mr. Ascoli twice as a result of new 
information being provided to them, resulting in more or different opinions. The 
Supplement again tried to change the landscape of the case, and the trial court properly 
exercised its considerable discretion in refusing to allow the supplementation. 
VI. The trial court properly denied plaintiffs claim for breach of fiduciary duty. 
The trial court correctly ruled that the informed consent statute precluded 
plaintiffs claim for breach of fiduciary duty. A fiduciary usually manages money or 
property for another and must exercise a standard of care in such management activity 
imposed by law or contract. Consequently, a fiduciary, as trustee of a confidence, owes 
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the beneficiary a common-law "duty of loyalty to guarantee beneficiaries' interests." 
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 224, 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000) (emphasis added). The 
traditional notions of a fiduciary do not easily translate into the physician-patient 
relationship because a physician does not provide such guarantees for care and treatment. 
Although the physician-patient relationship creates a relationship of trust and 
confidence, plaintiff overstates Utah law when he asserts that defendants had a "fiduciary 
duty of full disclosure." To the contrary, Utah courts have rejected the notion that a 
physician must advise his or her patient of "every material, conceivable risk." Ficklin v. 
MacFarlane, 550 P.2d 1295, 1297 (Utah 1976). The Utah Legislature has also carefully 
defined what criteria must be proved in order to recover for a lack of informed consent in 
a medical malpractice case. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-406. The term "full disclosure" 
is nowhere to be found in the Legislature's pronouncement. Recognizing a cause of 
action for breach of fiduciary duty as plaintiff has argued would circumvent the 
Legislature's criteria for establishing a cause of action for lack of informed consent. 
Plaintiff relies heavily on Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980) to argue 
that he is entitled to recover damages for a breach of fiduciary duty. In Nixdorf, the 
patient alleged that the physician had failed to disclose material information about the 
patient's physical condition after the patient underwent surgery, thus removing the 
disclosure from the context of informed consent. In Nixdorf, a needle was left in the 
patient during surgery and the doctor did not disclose this fact to patient even though he 
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knew of the fact. In this case, however, plaintiff alleges that defendants failed to disclose 
material information about planned treatment only before plaintiff underwent 
brachytherapy—in other words, defendants allegedly failed to provide informed consent. 
The Nixdorf 'court was careful to outline this distinction in its opinion, recognizing that 
the situation in the context of informed consent differed from that presented in that case. 
See id. at 354 n.20. The scope of the fiduciary duty recognized in Nixdorf 'must therefore 
be limited to its facts—facts which differ from those in this case. Accordingly, Nixdorf is 
properly limited to allowing a claim for breach of fiduciary duty only when it involves a 
failure to disclose known facts after a procedure. In those instances where a plaintiff 
alleges a failure to disclose risks, as opposed to known facts, before a procedure, the 
claim is a statutory claim for lack of informed consent. 
Although plaintiff attempts to make his own distinctions between a cause of 
action based on a lack of informed consent and a cause of action arising from a fiduciary 
duty, by outlining the elements necessary to prove each claim, those distinctions ignore 
the fact that the alleged facts in plaintiffs complaint giving rise to either cause of action 
were identical and, therefore, improperly duplicative. See, e.g., Bingham Consolidation 
Co. v. Groesbeck, 105 P.3d 365, 374 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the trial court 
properly consolidated shareholder's claim for breach of fiduciary duty into separate 
appraisal proceeding because allegations underlying both did not differ and could 
possibly result in duplicative damages). 
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Plaintiff relies on Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal.3d 120, 
271 Cal.Rptr. 146, 793 P.2d 479 (1990), to support his argument that a cause of action for 
breach of fiduciary duty by medical professionals should be recognized in Utah. In 
Moore, a physician failed to disclose to his patient that he planned to submit the patient's 
extracted tissue to an ongoing study from which the physician received economic 
benefits. See id. at 484. The court held that the plaintiff could assert a cause of action for 
a breach of fiduciary duty based only upon the physician's failure to disclose economic 
and research conflicts of interest. See id. at 485. The court did not apply a fiduciary 
standard to a physician's duty to disclose material information in the context of medical 
treatment. In fact, the court distinguished its holding from other informed consent cases 
in which the patient had made allegations of lack of informed consent regarding the 
planned medical procedure, risks and complications. See id. at 484-85 & n.9 (citing 
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d 229, 246, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1 (1972) (holding that 
physician need not disclose possible risks and complications of medical treatment 
"beyond that required within the medical community"). As such, Moore supports 
defendants' position that a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty should not be 
allowed in addition to a claim for informed consent. 
Plaintiffs reliance on Hoopes v. Hammargren, 725 P.2d 238 (Nev. 1986), is also 
misplaced. The patient in Hoopes sued for medical malpractice and also claimed that the 
psychiatrist had breached his fiduciary duty to her by taking sexual advantage of her. 
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The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the psychiatrist, dismissing the 
fiduciary duty claim. The Supreme Court of Nevada, however, reversed the district court, 
holding that the scope of the fiduciary duty included the sexual misconduct outside the 
context of medical treatment. Although the Nevada Supreme Court recognized a cause of 
action for breach of fiduciary duty in that particular circumstance, it did not hold that the 
fiduciary relationship between a physician and patient gave rise to a cause of action for 
an alleged failure to disclose the risks of treatment. 
Because plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claim is the same as his statutory 
claim for lack of informed consent, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in 
granting defendants' motion. 
VIL The trial court properly precluded plaintiffs attempt to amend his complaint 
to add a fraudulent concealment claim in order to avoid the applicable 
statutes of limitations. 
The trial court exercised proper discretion in precluding plaintiff from amending 
his complaint. Plaintiff filed his "Motion to Amend [his] Amended Complaint" over 
three years and seven months after filing the original complaint, almost one year after 
plaintiff acknowledged a possible claim for fraudulent concealment, and four months 
after the trial court granted plaintiffs first Motion to Amend. The trial court allowed 
plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint, and it properly exercised its discretion 
when it declined to allow plaintiff to do so again. 
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More than three years had passed since plaintiff filed the original complaint. 
When plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint in June 2006, he was aware of a possible 
cause of action for fraudulent concealment, but failed assert it. Rule 15 was never 
intended as an avenue for parties to assert unorganized, piecemeal claims, and justice did 
not require the trial court to permit it. 
Utah law makes clear that the trial court is well within its discretion to deny 
plaintiffs motion. See e.g. Westley v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983); see 
also Kelly v. Utah Power & Light, 746 P.2d 1189 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In Westerly, the 
plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to include an allegation that the defendant had 
acted with malice. 663 P.2d at 94. The trial court denied plaintiffs motion to amend. The 
Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial courf s ruling stating that u[a]n amendment would 
certainly have delayed the trial and the substance of plaintiff s new allegation was known 
a full year earlier when plaintiff discussed it in his deposition." See id. 
Similarly, in Kelly, two years after the other plaintiffs had amended their 
complaint to join the defendant, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend her complaint to 
join the defendant. 746 P.2d at 1190. Plaintiff argued that the defendant was not 
prejudiced because the defendant was aware of the action and had participated in 
discovery. The Utah court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
by denying plaintiffs motion to amend because "mere awareness of an action against 
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other parties does not require a defendant to prepare a defense in anticipation of 
plaintiffs decision at some future time to join defendant as a party." Id. 
The facts of the instant case are remarkably similar to the above-referenced cases 
in which Utah appellate courts have held it was not an abuse of discretion to deny a 
motion to amend. Plaintiff was aware of his possible cause of action for fraudulent 
concealment in August 2006, but plaintiff failed to assert this cause of action when the 
trial court permitted him to amend his complaint in March 2007. Plaintiff sought to 
amend again based upon information he knew in August 2006 and at the inception of this 
case. Plaintiff did not provide any reason sufficient to justify his failure to include a 
cause of action for fraudulent concealment in his first Amended Complaint. Thus, the 
trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend his 
complaint a second time to include a claim of which he was unaware of the last time he 
amended his complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing facts and authorities, defendants request this Court to 
affirm the trial court's rulings and the jury's conclusion that plaintiff failed to initiate this 
appeal within the applicable two-year statute of limitations. 
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DATED this day of January, 2009. 
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ADDENDUM 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The defendants in this case have raised as a defense to the Plaintiffs claim of 
medical malpractice that Plaintiff did not commence this action within the time required 
by law, and that as a result thereof, Plaintiff is not entitled to recover. There are statutes 
that specify how much time a person has to bring certain kinds of claims. These are 
called statutes of limitation. A person cannot recover on a claim that is brought after the 
time period that applies to a particular claim, even if it is only one day late. 
INSTRUCTION N O . 7 ^ 
The statute of limitation that applies to Plaintiffs claim from medical malpractice 
provides that the claim must be brought within a specified amount of time after Plaintiff 
discovered his legal injury. You must determine whether the Plaintiff knew or should 
have known, through the use of reasonable diligence, on or before May 6, 2001, that he 
had suffered an injury and that the injury may be attributable to negligence. 
The Defendants have the burden of proof on this issue. If the greater weight of the 
evidence supports the Defendant's defense on this issue, you must find that Plaintiffs 
claim is time barred and your verdict will be for the Defendants. If, however, you find 
that the greater weight of the evidence does not support the Defendants' position or that 
the facts are evenly balanced, then your verdict should be for the Plaintiff. 
INSTRUCTION NOy^T 
The statute of limitations does not require a plaintiff to receive full enlightenment 
concerning the cause and date of his legal injury. Instead, discovery of an injury occurs 
when a plaintiffs knows or, through the use of reasonable diligence, should know, that he 
has suffered a physical injury and that this injury was caused by or may be attributable to 
negligence. An individual does not need certain knowledge of negligence in order to 
"discover" his injury. Instead, all that is necessary is that the plaintiff recognize the 
possibility that the injury was caused by negligence. This means that the plaintiff must be 
aware of facts that would lead an ordinary person, using reasonable diligence, to conclude 
that a claim for negligence may exist. In making this determination, you may consider 
any information of which you believe the Plaintiff was aware. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7^ 
An injured person need not determine the identity of the person responsible for his 
injury to determine that he has been injured and that the injury was possibly tied to 
negligence. 
INSTRUCTION N O T 
"Negligence," as that word is used in the previous instructions, is defined as the 
failure to exercise that degree of care that other qualified physicians would ordinarily 
exercise under the same circumstances. 
However, you have not been presented with any evidence regarding whether the 
Defendants' actions were negligent. Therefore, that issue is not before you at this time. 
But, you must still decide if the Plaintiff was or should have been aware of 
sufficient facts to conclude that he may have had a claim for negligence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The statute of limitation that applies to Plaintiffs claim from medical malpractice 
provides that the claim must be brought within a specified amount of time after Plaintiff 
discovered his legal injury. You must determine whether the Plaintiff knew or should 
have known, through the use of reasonable diligence, on or before May 6, 2001, that he 
had suffered an injury and that the injury may be attributable to negligence. 
The Defendants have the burden of proof on this issue. If the greater weight of the 
evidence supports the Defendant's defense on this issue, you must find that Plaintiffs 
claim is time barred and your verdict will be for the Defendants. If, however, you find 
that the greater weight of the evidence does not support the Defendants' position or that 
the facts are evenly balanced, then your verdict should be for the Plaintiff 
Citations: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404 (i): "A malpractice action against a health care 
provider shall be commence within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through 
the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury ...." 
Hove v. McMaster, 621 P.2d 694, 697 (Utah 1980): "plaintiff knew or should 
have known within two years from the date of the injection that the injury she suffered may have 
been caused by negligence on the part of defendant." See also Duerden v. Utah Valley Hospital, 
663 F. Supp. 781, 783 (D. Utah 1987) 
INSTRUCTION NQy^P 
The statute of limitations does not require a plaintiff to receive full enlightenment 
concerning the cause and date of his legal injury. Instead, discovery of an injury occurs 
when a plaintiffs knows or, through the use of reasonable diligence, should know, that he 
has suffered a physical injury and that this injury was caused by or may be attributable to 
negligence. An individual does not need certain knowledge of negligence in order to 
"discover" his injury. Instead, all that is necessary is that the plaintiff recognize the 
possibility that the injury was caused by negligence. This means that the plaintiff must be 
aware of facts that would lead an ordinary person, using reasonable diligence, to conclude 
that a claim for negligence may exist. In making this determination, you may consider 
any information of which you believe the Plaintiff was aware. 
Citations: 
Hargett v. Limber-g, 598 F. Supp. 152, 155 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd on other 
grounds, 801 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1986): "Under Foil and its progeny, a legal determination of 
negligence is not necessary to start the statute of limitations. Rather, the crucial question is 
whether the plaintiff was aware of the facts that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that 
he may have a cause of action against the health care provider. Those facts include the existence 
of an injury, its cause and the possibility of negligence. "See also McHenry v. Utah Valley 
Regional Hosp. , 74 F. Supp. 835, 837 (D. Utah 1989); Deschamps vs. Pulley, 784 P. 2d 471, 
473-25 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting claim that confirmation of negligence is necessary 
because that "position confuse[s] 'legal injury' with legal conclusion of negligence."). 
INSTRUCTION NO.>> 
An injured person need not determine the identity of the person responsible for his 
injury to determine that he has been injured and that the injury was possibly tied to 
negligence. 
Citations: 
McDougal v. Weed, 945 P.2d 175, 177-78 (Utah Ct. App. 1997): "Our decision 
today comports with prior Utah Supreme Court interpretation of the statutory scheme, which has 
focused solely on the time of the discovery of the injury and the injury's ties to negligence. See 
Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361,1363 (Utah 1996); Chapman v. Primary Children'sHosp. 784 
P.2d 1181,1184 (Utah 1989); Foil v. Bollinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979). Our decision is 
also consistent with the case law from other jurisdictions holding that discovery of a possible 
malpractice cause of action, and not discovery of a defendant's identity, triggers that limitations 
period." "Accordingly, we hold that the malpractice statute of limitations is tied only to the 
discovery of the plaintiffs legal injury and not to the discovery of the tortfeasor's identity." Id. at 
178. 
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